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0. Word Power. 
 
Of course, words aren’t magic.  Neither are sextants, compasses, maps, slide rules and all 
the other paraphenelia which have accreted around the basic biological brains of homo 
sapiens.  In the case of these other tools and props, however, it is transparently clear that 
they function so as to either carry out or to facilitate computational operations important to 
various human projects.  The slide rule transforms complex mathematical problems (ones 
that would baffle or tax the unaided subject) into simple tasks of perceptual recognition.  
The map provides geographical information in a format well-suited to aid complex 
planning and strategic military operations.  The compass gathers and displays a kind of 
information that (most) unaided human subjects do not seem to command.  These various 
tools and props thus act to generate information, or to store it, or to transform it, or some 
combination of the three.  In so doing, they impact our individual and collective problem-
solving capacities in much the same dramatic ways as various software packages impact the 
performance of a simple pc. 
 
Public language, I shall argue, is just such a tool -- it is a species of external artifact whose 
current adaptive value is partially constituted by its role in re-shaping the kinds of 
computational space that our biological brains must negotiate in order to solve certain types 
of problems, or to carry out certain complex projects.  This computational role of language 
has been somewhat neglected (not un-noticed, but not rigorously pursued either) in recent 
cognitive science, due perhaps to a (quite proper) fascination with and concentration upon, 
that other obvious dimension: the role of language as an instrument of interpersonal 
communication.  Work on sentence parsing, language use and story understanding has thus 
concentrated on the role of language in processes of information transfer between agents 
and on information retrieval from texts.  But it has had little to say about the computational 
role of the linguistic formulations themselves, or about the special properties of the external 





In this treatment, I hope to display the broad shape of such an alternative interest.  I begin 
by discussing the views of some recent (and not-so-recent) authors, who recognize in 
various ways, the potential role of language and text in transforming, reshaping and 
simplifying the computational tasks that confront the biological brain.  Section 2 pursues 
this broad vision across a variety of cases involving planning, coordination, learning and 
the construction of complex thoughts and arguments.  The third section extends these last 
considerations to encompass the rather special class of meta-cognitive operations and tries 
to implicate language as a n essential part of the process of thinking about our own 
thoughts and cognitive profiles.  The final section suggests some broader implications and 
raises some questions concerning the boundary between the intelligent agent and the world. 
 
1. Supra-Communicative Views of Language. 
 
The idea that language may do far more than merely serve as a vehicle for communication 
is not new.  It is clearly present in the work of developmentalists such as Vygotsky (1962), 
and more  recently that of Laura Berk and others (see e.g. essays in Diaz and Berk (1992)).  
It figures in the philosophical conjectures and arguments of e.g. Peter Carruthers (to 
appear) and Ray Jackendoff (to appear).  And it surfaces in the more cognitive science 
oriented speculations of Daniel Dennett (1991).  It will be helpful to begin by rehearsing 
some of the central ideas in this literature, before pursuing our own version viz. the idea of 
language as a computational transformer which allows pattern-completing brains to tackle 
otherwise intractable classes of cognitive problems. 
 
Lev Vygotsky, a Soviet psychologist of the 1930's, pioneered the idea that the use of public 
language had profound effects on cognitive development.  He posited powerful links 
between speech, social experience and learning.  Two especially pertinent Vygotskian 
ideas, for present purposes, concern the role of private speech, and of scaffolded action 
(action within the so-called zone of proximal development -- see Vygotsky (trans., 1962)).  
We may call an action scaffolded to the extent that it relies on some kind of external 
support.  Such support could come from the use of tools, or the knowledge and skills of 
others; that is to say, scaffolding (as I shall use the term) denotes a broad class of physical, 
cognitive and social augmentations -- augmentations which allow us to achieve some goal 
which would otherwise be beyond us.  Simple examples include the use of a compass and 
pencil to draw a perfect circle, the role of other crew members in enabling a ship's pilot to 
steer a course and the infants ability to take its first steps only while suspended in the 
enabling grip of its parents.  Vygotsky's focus on what was termed the Zone of Proximal 
Development was concerned with this latter type of case, in which a child is temporarily 
able to succeed at designated tasks only by courtesy of the guidance or help provided by 
another human being (usually, a parent or teacher).  This idea dovetails with Vygotsky's 
interest in private speech in the following way.  When the child, confronted by a tricky 
challenge, is talked through the problem by a more experienced agent, the child can often 
succeed at tasks which would otherwise prove impossible (think of learning to tie your 
shoelaces).  Later on, when the adult is absent, the child can conduct a similar dialogue, but 
this time with herself.  But even in this latter case, it is argued, the speech (be it vocal or 
internalized) functions so as to guide behavior, to focus attention, and to guard against 




-- it is a tool for structuring and controlling action and not merely a medium of information 
transfer between agents. 
 
This Vygotskian image is supported by more recent bodies of developmental research, such 
as that carried out by Laura Berk and Ruth Garvin.  Berk and Garvin (1984) observed and 
recorded the ongoing speech of a group of 5-10 year olds in Kentucky.  They found that 
most of the children's private speech (speech not addressed to some other listener) seemed 
keyed to the direction and control of the child's own actions.  They found that the incidence 
of such speech increased when the child was alone and engaged in trying to perform some 
difficult task.  In subsequent studies (Bivens and Berk (1990), Berk (1994)) it was found 
that the children who made the most self-directed comments were the ones who 
subsequently mastered the tasks best.  Berk’s conclusions, from these and other studies, 
was that self-directed speech (be it vocal or silent inner rehearsal) is a crucial cognitive tool 
that allows us to highlight the most puzzling features of new situations, and to direct and 
control our own problem-solving actions. 
 
The theme of language as a tool has also been developed by the philosopher Christopher 
Gauker.  Gauker's concern, however, is to re-think the intra-individual role of language in 
terms of (what he calls) a cause-effect analysis.  The idea here is to depict public language 
not as a tool for representing the world or expressing one’s thoughts but a tool for effecting 
changes in ones environment (Gauker (1990) p. 31).  To get the flavor, consider the use of 
a symbol, by a chimpanzee, to request a banana.  The chimp touches a specific key on a 
key-pad (the precise physical location of the key can be varied between trials) and learns 
that making that symbol light tends to promote the arrival of bananas.  The chimp=s quasi-
linguistic understanding is explicable Gauker suggests, in terms of the chimp=s 
appreciation of a cause-effect relationship between the symbol production and changes in 
its local environment.  Gauker looks at a variety of symbol-using behaviors and concludes 
that they all succumb to this kind of analysis.  This leads him to hypothesize that, although 
clearly more complex, human beings linguistic understanding likewise consists in a grasp 
of the causal relations into which linguistic signs may enter (Gauker, op.cit., 44). 
 
Gauker tends to see the role of language as, if you like, directly causal: as a way of getting 
things done, much like reaching out your hand and grabbing a cake.  However, the idea that 
we learn, by experience, of the peculiar causal potencies of specific signs and symbols is in 
principle much broader.  We might even, as in the Vygotskian examples and as argued in 
Dennett (1991), discover that the self-directed utterance of words and phrases has certain 
effects on our own behavior!  We might also learn to exploit language as a tool in a variety 
of even less direct ways, as a means of altering the shape of computational problem spaces 
(see Section 2 following). 
 
One obvious question which the putative role of language as a self-directed tool raises is 
how does it work?.  What is it about, for example, self-directed speech which fits it to play 
a guiding role?  After all, it is not at all clear how we can tell ourselves anything we don't 
already know!  Surely, all that public language can ever be is a medium for expressing 




It is precisely this view which a supra-communicative account of language has ultimately to 
reject. 
 
One way to do so is to depict public language as itself the medium of a special kind of 
thought.  Another (not altogether distinct) way is to depict linguaform inputs as having 
distinctive effects on some inner computational device.  Peter Carruthers1 (to appear) 
champions the first of these, while Daniel Dennett (1991) offers a version of the second.  
Thus Carruthers argues that, in this case at least, we should take very seriously the evidence 
of our own introspection.  It certainly often seems as if our very thoughts are composed of 
the words and sentences of public language.  And the reason we have this impression, 
Carruthers argues, is because it is true: Ainner thinking is literally done in inner speech (see 
Carruthers (to appear) ch. 2 for an extensive discussion).  By extension, Carruthers is able 
to view many intra-personal uses of language as less a matter of simple communication 
than of (what he nicely terms) public thinking.  This perspective fits satisfyingly with the 
Vygotskian view championed by Berk, and is also applicable to the interesting case of 
writing down our ideas.  Here Carruthers suggests one does not first entertain a private 
thought and then write it down: rather, the thinking is the writing (Carruthers, to appear, 
MS p. 56).  I shall return to this point later (see section 2), since I believe that what 
Carruthers says is almost right, but that we can better understand the kind of case he has in 
mind by treating the writing as an environmental manipulation which transforms the 
problem space for human brains. 
 
Carruthers, in depicting language as itself the vehicle of (certain types of) thought, is 
nonetheless careful to reject what he calls the Whorfian Relativism of the Standard Social 
Science Model (op.cit., MS p. 302).  The reference here is to the idea, promoted by 
Benjamin Whorf (1956), that human minds are profoundly shaped and altered by the 
particular public languages we come to speak.  Carruthers view is not that specific 
languages somehow deeply alter or re-program the brain, but rather2 that certain kinds of 
human thinking are actually constituted by sequences of public language symbols (written 
down, spoken, or internally imagined).  Such a hypothesis, Carruthers argues, can help 
account for a wide range of both introspective and experimental and pathological data3.   
 
An alternative way to unpack a supra-communicative view of language, we noted, is to 
suppose that the linguistic inputs actually re-program or otherwise alter the high-level 
computational structure of the brain itself.  The exegesis is delicate (and therefore 
tentative), but something akin to this view seems to be held by Daniel Dennett when he 
suggests that conscious human minds are more-or-less serial virtual machines 
implemented-inefficiently-on the parallel hardware that evolution has provided for us 
(Dennett, 1991, p. 278).  In this and other passages, the idea seems to be that the 
bombardment of (something like) parallel processing, connectionist, pattern-completing 
brains by (amongst other things) public language texts and sentences (reminders, plans, 
exhortations, questions, etc.), results in a kind of cognitive reorganization akin to that 
which occurs when one computer system simulates another.  In such cases, the installation 
of a new program allows the user to treat e.g. a serial LISP machine as if it was a massively 




same trick in reverse viz. the simulation of something like a serial logic engine using the 
altogether different resources of the massively parallel neural networks which biological 
evolution rightly favors for real-world, real-time survival and action. 
 
Strikingly, Dennett suggests that it is this subtle re-programming of the brain by (primarily) 
linguistic bombardment which yields the phenomena of human consciousness (our sense of 
self) and enables us to far surpass the behavioral and cognitive achievements of most other 
animals (see e.g. Dennett (1995) p. 370-373).  Dennett thus depicts our advanced cognitive 
skills as in large part a result not of our innate hardware (which may differ only in small, 
though important, ways from that of other animals) but of the special way that various 
plastic (programmable) features of the brain are modified by the effects of culture and 
language.  As Dennett puts it, the serial machine is installed courtesy of myriad 
microsettings in the plasticity of the brain (Dennett (1991) p. 219).  Of course, mere 
exposure to culture and language is not sufficient to ensure human-like cognition.  You can 
expose a cockroach to all the language you like and get no trace of the cognitive 
transformations which Dennett sees in us.  Dennett’s claim is not that there are no initial 
hardware level differences.  Rather it is that some relatively small hardware differences 
(e.g. between us and a chimpanzee) allow us to both create and benefit from public 
language and other cultural developments in ways which lead to a great snowball of 
cognitive change and augmentation, including, crucially, the literal installation of a new 
kind of computational device inside the brain. 
 
Dennett's vision is complex, and not altogether unambiguous.  The view I want to develop 
is clearly deeply related, but differs (I think) in one crucial respect.  Where Dennett sees 
public language as effecting a profound but subtle re-organization of the brain itself, I am 
inclined to see it as in essence heart an external resource which complements -- but does 
not profoundly alter -- the brains own basic modes of representation and computation.  That 
is to say, I see the changes as relatively superficial ones, geared to allowing us to use and 
exploit various external resource to the full.  The positions are not, of course, wholly 
distinct.  The mere fact that we often mentally rehearse sentences in our head and use them 
to guide and alter our behavior means that one cannot (and should not) treat language and 
culture as wholly external resources.  Nonetheless, it remains possible that such rehearsal 
neither requires nor results in the installation of any fundamentally different kind of 
computational device in the brain, but rather involves the use of the same old (essentially 
pattern-completing) resources to model the special kinds of behavior observed in the public 
linguistic world.  And as Paul Churchland (1995, p. 264-269) points out, there is indeed a 
class of connectionist networks (recurrent networks -- see Elman (1993), and further 
discussion in Clark (1993)) which do seem well-suited to modeling such behavior.   
 
This view of inner rehearsal is nicely developed by the connectionists Rumelhart, 
Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton who argue that the general strategy of mentally 
modeling the behavior of selected aspects of our environment is especially important 
insofar as it allows us to imagine external resources with which we have previously 
physically interacted, and to replay the dynamics of such interactions in our heads.  Thus 
experience with drawing and using Venn diagrams allows us to train a neural network 




imaginative manipulations require a specially trained neural resource to be sure.  But there 
is no reason to suppose that such training results in the installation of a different kind of 
computational device.  It is the same old process of pattern completion in high dimensional 
representational spaces, but applied to the special domain of a specific kind of external 
representation, The link to a Vygotskian image is clear and remarked upon by the authors 
who the summarize their view saying: 
 
We can be instructed to behave in a particular way.  Responding to instructions in 
this way can be viewed simply as responding to some environmental event.  We can 
also remember such an instruction and tell ourselves what to do.  We have, in this 
way, internalized the instruction.  We believe that the process of following 
instructions is essentially the same whether we have told ourselves or have been told 
what to do.  Thus even here we have a kind of internalization of an external 
representational format. 
(Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton 
(1986)      p.47) 
 
The larger passage (p. 44-48) from which the above is extracted is, in fact, remarkably rich 
and touches on several of our major themes.  The authors note that such external 
formalisms are especially hard to invent and slow to develop, and are themselves the kinds 
of product which (in an innocently bootstrapping kind of way) can evolve only thanks to 
the linguistically-mediated processes of cultural storage and gradual refinement over many 
lifetimes.  They also note that by using real external representations we put ourselves in a 
position to use our basic perceptual/motor skills to separate problems into parts and to 
attend to a series of sub-problems, storing intermediate results along the way. 
 
The Rumelhart et al vision thus depicts language as a key element in a variety of 
environmentally extended computational processes.  This notion of computational 
processes inhering in larger systems (ones that may incorporate the activities of many 
individual biological brains) is further developed and defended in Hutchins (1995).  
Hutchins offers a beautiful and detailed treatment that highlights the ways representation 
may flow and be transformed within larger, socially and technologically extended systems.  
Hutchins' main example involves the way maps, instruments, texts and vocalizations all 
contribute to the complex process of ship navigation: a process that is best analyzed as an 
extended sequence of computational transitions, many of whose role is to transform 
problems into formats better situated to the perceptual and pattern-completing capacities of 
biological brains.  The environmental operations thus complement the activities of the 
biological brains. 
 
The tack I am about to pursue likewise depicts language as an external artifact designed to 
complement, rather than recapitulate or transfigure, the basic processing profile we share 
with other animals.  It does not depict experience with language as a source of profound 
inner re-programming (pacé Dennett).  Whether it depicts inner linguistic rehearsal as 
literally constitutive of specific human cognizings (as Carruthers claims) is moot.  
Certainly, inner rehearsals, when they occur, are quite literally models of linguistic 




we actually think in words (to which the answer is in a way yes, in a way no!) but to try to 
see what computational benefits accrue to biological pattern-completing brains in virtue of 
their ability to manipulate and sometimes model external representational artifacts.   
 
2. Language and Computation: The 6 Ways. 
 
Here, then, are  six broad ways in which linguistic artifacts can complement the activity of 
the pattern-completing brain. 
i.   Memory Augmentation. 
This is, of course, the most obvious and oft-remarked case.  Here we simply use the 
artifactual world of texts, diaries, notebooks and the like as a means of systematically 
storing large and often complex bodies of data.  We may also use simple external 
manipulations (such as leaving a note on the mirror) to prompt the recall, from on-board 
biological memory, of appropriate information and intentions at the right time.  Here, the 
use of linguistic artifacts is perfectly continuous with a variety of other, simpler, 
environmental manipulations, such as leaving the empty olive oil bottle by the door so that 
you cannot help but run across it (and hence recall the need for olive oil) as you set out for 
the shops. 
 
ii. Environmental Simplification. 
This has both an obvious and a not-so-obvious aspect.  The obvious (but still important) 
aspect concerns the use of labels to provide perceptually simple clues to help us negotiate 
complex environments.  Signs for the cloakrooms, for nightclubs, and for city centers all 
fulfill this role.  They allow a little learning to go a very long way, helping you find your 
targets in new cities without knowing in advance what, in detail, to seek or even where 
exactly to seek it.  McClamrock (1995 p. 88) describes this strategy as one in which we 
enforce on the environment certain kinds of stable properties that will lessen our 
computational burdens and the demands on us for inference. 
 
Closely related, but much less obvious, is the provision, by the use of linguistic labels, of a 
greatly simplified learning environment.  It can be shown, for example, that the provision 
of linguistic labels for classes of perceptually presented objects can speed category learning 
in artificial neural networks.  This is because the presentation of the same label 
accompanying a series of slightly different perceptual inputs (e.g., different views of dogs) 
gives the network a heavy hint.  It flags the presence of some further underlying structure 
and thus invites the network to seek the perceptual commonality (for a detailed discussion 
see Schyns (1991), Clark (1993) Ch. 5).   It also seems likely (though no formal 
demonstration exists) that for certain very abstract concepts, the only route to successful 
learning may go via the provision of linguistic glosses.  Concept such as charity, extortion 
and black hole seem pitched too far from perceptual facts to be learnable without exposure 
to linguistically formulated theories.  Language may thus enable us to comprehend 
equivalence classes that would otherwise lie forever outside our intellectual horizons. 
 
iii. Coordination and the Reduction of On-Line Deliberation. 
Human beings often make explicit plans.  We say to others that we will be at such and such 




down a list of what we will do on what days and so on.  Superficially, the role of such 
explicit planning is to allow the coordination of actions.  Thus, if the other person knows 
you have said you'll be at the station at 9:00 a.m., they can time their taxi accordingly.  Or, 
in the solo case, if you have to buy the paint before touching up the car, and if you have to 
go to the shops to buy other items anyway, you can minimize your efforts and enforce 
proper sequencing by following a plan.  As the space of demands and opportunities grows, 
it often becomes necessary to use pencil and paper to organize and to re-organize the 
options, and then to preserve the result as a kind of external control structure available to 
guide your subsequent actions. 
 
Closely related to such coordinative functions is the function of oiling the wheels of 
collaborative problem-solving.  Collaborative problem solving (see e.g., Tomasello et al 
(1993) involves much more than the mere exchange of information and orchestration of 
activity.  It involves actively prompting the other to work harder at certain aspects of a 
problem, and allowing the other to focus your own attention in places you might otherwise 
ignore.  Here, then, the co-ordinative function of linguistic exchange phases into the further 
one of manipulating attention and controlling resource allocation (see (v) below). 
 
Such broadly co-ordinative functions, thought important, do not exhaust the benefits of 
explicit (usually language-based) planning.  As Michael Bratman has recently pointed out, 
the creation of explicit plans may play a special role in reducing the on-line cognitive load 
on resource-limited agents like ourselves.  The idea here is that our plans have a kind of 
stability which pays dividends by reducing the amount of deliberation in which we engage 
as we go about much of our daily business.  Of course, new information can, and often 
does, cause us to revise our plans.  But we do not let every slight change prompt a re-
assessment of our plans, intentions, even when other things being equal, we might now 
choose slightly differently.  Human plans and intentions, Bratman suggests, play the role of 
blocking a wasteful process of continual re-assessment and choice, except in cases where 
there is some quite major pay-off for the disruption. (See Bratman (1987) for a full 
discussion).  
 
Linguistic exchange and formulation thus plays a key role in coordinating activities (both at 
an inter- and intra-personal level) and in reducing the amount of daily on-line deliberation 
in which we engage. 
 
iv. Taming Path-Dependent Learning. 
Human learning, like learning in Artificial Neural Networks, looks hostage to at least some 
degree of path dependency.  Certain ideas can be understood only once others are in place.  
The training received by one mind fits it to grasp and expand upon ideas which gain no 
foothold of comprehension in another.  The processes of formal education, indeed, are 
geared to take young (and not so young) minds along a genuine intellectual journey, which 
may involve beginning with ideas now known to be incorrect, but which alone seem able to 
prime the system to later appreciate a finer grained truth.  Such mundane facts are a 
reflection of cognitive path dependence -- you can't get everywhere from anywhere; where 
you are now strongly constrains your future intellectual trajectory.  Moreover, such path 




involving something like a process of computational search in a large and complex space.  
Previous learning inclines the system to try out certain locations in the space and not others.  
When the prior learning is appropriate, the job of learning some new regularity is made 
tractable: the prior learning acts as a filter on the space of options to be explored.  Artificial 
Neural Networks which employ gradient descent learning methods are highly constrained 
insofar as the learning routine forces the network always to explore at the edges of its 
current weight assignments.  Since these constitute its current knowledge, it means that 
such networks cannot jump around in hypothesis space.  The networks current location in 
weight space (its current knowledge) is thus a major constraint on what new ideas it can 
next explore (see Elman (1993) p.94). 
 
When confronting devices which exhibit some degree of path dependency, the mundane 
observation that language allows ideas to be preserved and to migrate between individuals 
takes on a new force.  For we can now appreciate how such migrations may allow the 
communal construction of extremely delicate and difficult intellectual trajectories and 
progressions.  An idea which only Joe's prior experience could make available, but which 
can flourish only in the intellectual niche currently provided by the brain of Mary, can now 
realize its full potential by journeying between agents as and when required.  Moreover, the 
sheer number of intellectual niches available within a linguistically linked community 
provides a stunning matrix of possible inter-agent trajectories.  The observation that public 
language allows human cognition to be collective (e.g. Churchland (1995) p. 270) takes on 
new depth once we recognize the role of such collective endeavor in transcending the path-
dependent nature of individual human cognition.   
 
v. Attention and Resource Allocation. 
Ron McClamrock reports a nice case from Marr4 in which we see a control loop which runs 
outside the head and into the local environment, In McClamrock's words: 
 
Flies, it turns out, don't quite know that to fly they should flap their wings.  They 
don=t take off by sending some signal from the brain to the wings.  Rather, there is a 
direct control link from the fly’s feet to its wings, such that when the feet cease to be 
in contact with a surface, the fly's wings begin to flap.  To take off, the fly simply 
jumps and then lets the signal from the feet trigger the wings. 
 
McClamrock (1995) p. 85; emphasis in original. 
 
Notice, then, how written and spoken language at times serves a similar goal.  We write 
down a note to do such and such, thus creating an externalized control loop for our own 
future behavior.  We follow someones vocal instructions as we learn to windsurf.  Or we 
mentally rehearse such instruction as we practice on our own.  Such phenomena reveal 
linguistic formulations as somehow helping to focus, monitor and control behavior.  I do 
not think we yet understand exactly how language (especially mental rehearsal of 
instructions) interacts with more basic on-line resources so as to yield these benefits.  But 
that it does indeed play some such role seems clear. 
 




This final benefit accrues most directly to the use of actual text.  As I construct this chapter, 
for example, I am continually creating, putting aside, and re-organizing chunks of text.  I 
have a file which contains all kinds of hints and fragments, stored up over a long period of 
time, which may be germane to the discussion.  I have source texts and papers full of notes 
and annotations.  As I (literally, physically) move these things about, interacting first with 
one, then another, making new notes, annotations and plans, so the intellectual shape of the 
chapter grows and solidifies.  It is a shape which does not spring fully developed from inner 
cogitations.  Instead, it is the product of a sustained and iterated sequence of interactions 
between my brain and a variety of external props.  In these cases, I am willing to say, a 
good deal of actual thinking involves loops and circuits which run outside the head and 
through the local environment.  Extended intellectual arguments and theses are almost 
always the product of brains acting in concert with multiple external resources.  These 
resources enable us to pursue manipulations and juxtapositions of ideas and data which 
would quickly baffle the un-augmented brain.  (The simple case of physically manipulating 
Scrabble tiles to present new potential word-fragments to a pattern-completing brain (see 
Kirsh (to appear)) is a micro-version of the same strategy).  In all such cases, the real 
environment of printed words and symbols allows us to search, store, sequence and 
reorganize data in ways alien to the on-board repertoire of the biological brain. 
 
The moral of the 6 ways is thus clear.  The role of public language and text in human 
cognition is not limited to the preservation and communication of ideas.  Instead, these 
external resources make available concepts, strategies and learning trajectories which are 
simply not available to individual, un-augmented brains.  Much of the true power of 
language lies in its underappreciated capacity to re-shape the computational spaces which 
confront intelligent agents. 
 
3. Mangroves and Meta-Cognition. 
 
If a tree is seen growing on an island, which do you suppose came first?  It is natural (and 
usually correct) to assume that the island provided the fertile soil in which a lucky seed 
came to rest.  Mangrove forests,5 however, constitute a revealing exception to this general 
rule.  The Mangrove grows from a floating seed which establishes itself in the water, 
rooting in shallow mud flats.  The seedling sends complex vertical roots through the surface 
of the water, culminating in what looks to all intents and purposes like a small tree posing 
on stilts.  The complex system of aerial roots, however, soon traps floating soil, weed and 
debris.  After a time, the accumulation of trapped matter forms a small island.  As more 
time passes, the island grows larger and larger.  A growing mass of such islands can 
eventually merge, effectively extending the shoreline out to the trees!  Throughout this 
process, and despite our prior intuitions, it is the land which is progressively built by the 
trees. 
 
Something like the Mangrove effect, I suspect, is operative in some species of human 
thought.  It is natural to suppose that words are always rooted in the fertile soil of pre-
existing thoughts.  But sometimes, at least, the influence seems to run in the other direction.  




express thoughts.  Rather, it is often the properties which of the words (their structure and 
cadence) which determine the thoughts that the poem comes to express.  A similar partial 
reversal can occur during the construction of complex texts and arguments.  By writing 
down our ideas we generate a trace in a format which opens up a range of new possibilities.  
We can then inspect and re-inspect the same ideas, coming at them from many different 
angles and in many different frames of mind.  We can hold the original ideas steady so that 
we may judge them, and safely experiment with subtle alterations.  We can store them in 
ways which allow us to compare and combine them with other complexes of ideas in ways 
which would quickly defeat the un-augmented imagination.  In these ways, and as 
remarked in the previous section, the real properties of physical text transform the space of 
possible thoughts. 
 
Such observations lead me to the following conjecture.  Perhaps it is public language which 
is responsible for a complex of rather distinctive features of human thought viz, our ability 
to display second order cognitive dynamics.  By second order cognitive dynamics I mean a 
cluster of powerful capacities involving self-evaluation, self-criticism and finely honed 
remedial responses.6 Examples would include: recognizing a flaw in our own plan or 
argument, and dedicating further cognitive efforts to fixing it; reflecting on the unreliability 
of our own initial judgements in certain types of situations and proceeding with special 
caution as a result; coming to see why we reached a particular conclusion by appreciating 
the logical transitions in our own thought; thinking about the conditions under which we 
think best and trying to bring them about.  The list could be continued, but the patten 
should be clear.  In all these cases, we are effectively thinking about our own cognitive 
profiles or about specific thoughts.  This thinking about thinking, is a good candidate for a 
distinctively human capacity -- one not evidently shared by the other, non-language-using 
animals who share our planet.  As such, it is natural to wonder whether this might be an 
entire species of thought in which language plays the generative role -- a species of thought 
which is not just reflected in, or extended by, our use of words but is directly dependent 
upon language for its very existence.  Public language and the inner rehearsal of sentences 
would, on this model, act like the aerial roots of the Mangrove tree -- the words would 
serve as fixed points capable of attracting and positioning additional intellectual matter, 
creating the islands of second-order thought so characteristic of the cognitive landscape of 
homo sapiens. 
 
It is easy to see, in broad outline, how this might come about.  For as soon as we formulate 
a thought in words (or on paper), it becomes an object for both ourselves and for others.  As 
an object, it is the kind of thing we can have thoughts about.  In creating the object, we 
need have no thoughts about thoughts -- but once it is there, the opportunity immediately 
exists to attend to it as an object in its own right.  The process of linguistic formulation thus 
creates the stable structure to which subsequent thinkings attach. 
 
Just such a twist on potential role of the inner rehearsal of sentences has been suggested by 
the linguist Ray Jackendoff.  Jackendoff (to appear) suggests that the mental rehearsal of 
sentences may be the primary means by which our own thoughts are able to become objects 
of further attention and reflection.  The key claim is that linguistic formulation makes 




them up to a range of further mental operations.  It enables us, for example, to pick out 
different elements of complex thoughts and to scrutinize each in turn.  It enables us to 
stabilize very abstract ideas in working memory.  And it enables us to inspect and criticize 
our own reasoning in ways that no other representational modality allows. 
 
What fits internal sentence-based rehearsal to play such an unusual role?  The answer, I 
suggest, must lie in the more mundane (and temporally antecedent) role of language as an 
instrument of communication.  For in order to function as an efficient instrument of 
communication, public language will have been molded into a code well-suited to the kinds 
of interpersonal exchange in which ideas are presented, inspected and subsequently 
critiqued.  And this, in turn involves the development of a type of code which minimizes 
contextuality (most words retain more-or-less the same meaning in the different sentences 
in which they occur), is effectively modality-neutral (an idea may be prompted by visual, 
auditory or tactile input and yet be preserved using the same verbal formula), and allows 
easy rote memorization of simple strings.7  By freezing our own thoughts in the memorable, 
context-resistant and modality-transcending format of a sentence we thus create a special 
kind of mental object -- an object which is apt for scrutiny from multiple different cognitive 
angles, which is not doomed to alter or change every time we are exposed to new inputs or 
information, and which fixes the ideas at a fairly high level of abstraction from the 
idiosyncratic details of their proximal origins in sensory input.  Such a mental object is, I 
suggest, ideally suited to figure in the evaluative, critical and tightly focused operations 
distinction of second order cognition.  It is an object fit for the close and repeated 
inspections highlighted by Jackendoff under the rubric of attending to our own thoughts.  
The coding system of public language is thus especially apt to be co-opted for more private 
purposes of inner display, self-inspection and self-criticism, exactly as predicted by the 
Vygotskian treatments mentioned in Section 1 above.  Language stands revealed as a key 
resource by which we effectively redescribe8 our own thoughts in a format which makes 
them available for a variety of new operations and manipulations. 
 
The emergence of such second order cognitive dynamics is plausibly seen as one root of the 
veritable explosion of types and varieties of external scaffolding structures in human 
cultural evolution.  It is because we can think about our own thinking that we can actively 
structure our world in ways designed to promote, support and extend our own cognitive 
achievements.  This process also feeds itself, as when the arrival of written text and 
notation allowed us to begin to fix ever more complex and extended sequences of thought 
and reason as objects for further scrutiny and attention. 
 
To complete this picture, we should reflect that once the apparatus (internal and external) 
of sentential and text-based reflection is in place, we may expect the development of new 
types of non-linguistic thought and encoding – one’s dedicated to the task of managing and 
interacting with the sentences and texts in more powerful and efficient ways.9 The 
linguistic constructions, thus viewed, are a new class of objects which invite us to develop 
new (non-linguistically based) skills of use, recognition and manipulation.  Sentential and 
non-sentential modes of thought this co-evolve so as to complement, but not replicate, each 





It is a failure to appreciate this deep complementarity that, I suspect, leads Paul Churchland 
(one of the best and most imaginative neurophilosophers around) to dismiss linguaform 
expression as just as shallow reflection of our real knowledge.  Churchland fears that 
without such marginalization we might mistakenly depict all thought and cognition as 
involving the unconscious rehearsal of sentence-like symbol strings, and thus be blinded to 
the powerful, pattern-and-prototype-based encodings which look to be biologically and 
evolutionarily fundamental.  But we have now scouted much fertile intermediate territory.10 
In combining an array of biologically basic pattern-recognition skills with the special 
cognitive fixatives of word and text, we (like the Mangroves) create new landscapes, new 
fixed points in the sea of thought.  Viewed as a complementary cognitive artifact, language 
can genuinely extend our cognitive horizons -- and without the impossible burden of re-
capitulating the detailed contents of non-linguistic thought. 
 
4. Studying the Extended Mind. 
 
Speech and text, we have seen greatly extend the problem-solving capacities of humankind.  
More profoundly, the practice of putting thoughts into words alters the nature of human 
experience.  Our thoughts become determinate and public objects, apt for rational 
assessment and for all kinds of meta-cognitive scrutiny.  In thus recognizing public 
language as a powerful transformer of individual computational and experiential space, we 
invite reflection of a number of further topics.  I will end by mentioning just two. 
 
The first concerns the nature of the internal representations that guide human action.  A 
popular image, often associated with Jerry Fodor's reflections on the need for a language of 
thought (e.g., Fodor (1975)(1986)), depicts the internal representational arena as itself a 
locus of propositionally structured items -- sentences in Mentalese.  This image has lately 
been the subject of a damaging series of criticisms stemming from the successes of non-
linguaform computational approaches -- especially those of connectionist (or parallel 
distributed processing) models.  The perspective developed above might, I suspect, 
encourage us to approach some of these issues in a slightly different way, For the Fodorian 
view is at least intuitively linked to views of language as essentially a communicative tool.  
This is because the Fodorian sees linguistic formulations as reasonably faithful reflections 
of both the contents and the structural forms of internal representations.  The view I have 
been developing is quite different insofar as it depicts the linguistic formulations as 
importing genuine novelties onto our cognitive horizons.  The linguistic formulations are 
seen as novel both in content and in structure.  There is content-novelty insofar as linguistic 
expression makes new thoughts available by effectively freezing other thoughts as types of 
static object12 (images can do this too, but they are not so easily traded in public exchange).  
And there is structural novelty insofar as the value of the linguistic formulations (especially 
in written text) partly consists, we saw, in their amenability to a variety of operations and 
transformations that do not come naturally to the biological brain working in non-linguistic 
mode.  Such novelties, I contend, are not at all predicted by the image of a pre-existing 
inner code whose basic features and properties are merely recapitulated in our public 




code is not a handy recapitulation of our non-linguistic resources so much as a powerful 
complement to them.13   
 
Such a view suggests a certain gloss on the history and origin of the Fodorian image itself.  
For perhaps one mistake of classical Artificial Intelligence (upon which the image purports 
to be based) lay in its mistaking the properties of the linguistically augmented and 
environmentally extended cognitive agent (the person plus a variety of external 
representations, especially texts) for the cognitive profile of the basic biological brain.  
Thus the neat classical separation of data and process and of static symbol structures and 
CPU may have reflected nothing so much as the gross separation between the biological 
agent and an external scaffolding of ideas persisting on paper, in filing cabinets and in 
electronic media.   
 
This notion of the biological agent leads nicely to the second issue I wish to mention.  It 
concerns the question of where the mind ends and the rest of the world begins.  Otherwise 
put, the question concerns how to conceive and locate the boundary between an intelligent 
system and its world.  For certain external (to the biological unit) props and aids may play 
such a deep role in determining the shape and flow of our thoughts as to invite depiction as 
part and parcel of the very mechanism of human reason.  This depiction is most plausible in 
the case of the external props of written text and spoken words.  For interactions with these 
external media are ubiquitous (in educated modern cultures), reliable and developmentally 
basic.  Our biologic brains, after learning, expect the presence of text and speech as much 
as they expect to encounter weight, force, friction and gravity.  Language for us is a 
constant, and as such can be safely relied upon as the backdrop against which on-line 
processes of neural computation take shape and develop.  Just as a neural network 
controller for moving the arm to a target in space must define its commands to factor in the 
spring of muscles and the effects of gravity, so the processes of on-board reason may come 
to factor in the potential contributions of textual off-loading and reorganization, and vocal 
exchange.  The overall cognitive competencies which we identify as mind and intellect may 
thus be more like ship navigation than capacities of the bare biological brain.  Ship 
navigation (see Hutchins (1995)) is a global emergent from the well-orchestrated 
adaptation of an extended complex system (comprising individuals, instruments, and 
practices).  Much of what we uncritically identify as our mental capacities may likewise, I 
suspect, turn out to be properties of the wider, extended systems of which human brains are 
just one (important) part.  In constructing an academic paper, for example, it is common 
practice to deploy multiple annotated texts, sets of notes and files, plans, lists and more.  
The writing process often depends heavily on manipulations of these props -- new notes are 
created, old ones juxtaposed, source materials are wheeled on and off of work surfaces, etc.  
In giving credit for the final product, however, we often marginalize the special 
contributions of these external manipulations, and speak as if the biological brain did all the 
work.  No parallel temptation afflicts the person who uses a crane to lift large weights, or a 
motorized digger to plough trenches!  In these cases, it is clear that the person uses 
additional tools whose capacities extend and complement those of the unaided laborer.  The 
relative invisibility of the special cognitive roles of text and words are a reflection, I think, 
of their ubiquity and ease of use: a reflection, indeed, of our tendency to think of these 




additions.  Perhaps the truth lies midway -- the use of spoken words may be as biologically 
proper, to the human agent, as the use of webs is to the spider.15 And the use of written text 
may thus straddle the intuitive divide between the web (biologically proper) and the crane 
(a true artifact). 
 
The point, in any case, is that use of words and texts may usefully be seen as 
computationally complementary to the more primitive and biologically basic kinds of 
pattern-completing abilities that characterize natural cognition.  These complementary 
operations essentially involve the creation of self -standing structures (short-term ones, like 
spoken sentences, or long-term ones, like text) that can perform a variety of useful 
functions such as the sequencing and control of behavior and the freezing of thoughts and 
ideas into objects for further attention and analysis.  The availability of these functions 
extends the bound of human cognition as surely as the provision of a new board extends the 
bounds of a personal computer.  In particular, it is our capacity to create and operate upon 
external representations that allows us to use manipulations of the physical environment as 
integral parts of so many of our problem-solving routines.  In thus reaching out to the world 
we blunt the dividing line between the intelligent system and the world.  We create wider 
computational webs whose understanding and analysis may require us to apply the tools 
and concepts of cognitive science to larger, hybrid entities comprising brains, bodies and a 
variety of external structures, traces and processes. 
 
To endorse a notion of computational processes as criss-crossing brain, body and world is 
not yet to endorse a parallel notion of cognitive or mental processes.  Perhaps cognition is 
all in the head, but computation spreads liberally out into the world.  My own inclinations 
are less conservative.  I suspect that our intuitive notions of mind and cognition actually do 
pick out these larger extended systems and that as a result the biological brain is only one 
component of the intelligent system we call the mind.16 But I will settle for a weaker 
conclusion -- one that merely implicates our linguistic capacities in some highly productive 
transformations of our overall computational powers.  This power of computational 
transformation constitutes a neglected virtue of linguistic practice.  It reveals language as 
the ultimate upgrade: so ubiquitous it is almost invisible; so intimate, it is not clear whether 
it is a kind of tool or an added dimension of the user.  But whatever the boundaries, we 
confront a complex coalition in which the basic biological brain is fantastically empowered 







1.  A major focus of both Carruthers' and Dennett’s treatments is the relation between 
language and consciousness.  I will not discuss these issues here, save to say that my 
sympathies lie more with Churchland (1995, Chapter 10), who depicts basic consciousness 
as the common property of humans and many non-linguistic animals.  Language 
fantastically augments the power of human cognition.  But it does not, I believe, bring into 
being the basic apprehensions of pleasure, pain and the sensory world in which the true 
mystery of consciousness inheres. 
 
2.  Carruthers position, unlike Whorf's, is thus compatible with both a realist conception of 
the mental and a fair degree of linguistic nativism. 
 
3.  A quick sampling of this data includes: the developmental lock-step of cognitive and 
linguistic abilities, the difficulties which language-deficient humans have with certain kinds 
of temporal discourse and the deficits of abstract thought found in global aphasics.  See 
Carruthers (to appear) esp. MS p. 291. 
 
4.  Marr (1982) p. 32-33. 
 
5.  A particularly stunning example is the large Mangrove forest extending north from Key 
West, Florida to the Everglades region known as Ten Thousand Islands.  The black 
Mangroves of this region can reach heights of 80 feet -- see Landi (1982) p. 361-363. 
 
6.  Two very recent treatments which emphasize these themes have been brought to my 
attention.  Jean-Pierre Changeux (a neuroscientist and molecular biologist) and Alain 
Connes (a mathematician) suggest that self-evaluation is the mark of true intelligence -- see 
Changeux and Connes (1995).  Derek Bickerton  (a linguist) celebrates off-line thinking 
and notes that no other species seems to isolate problems in their own performance and take 
pointed action to rectify them -- see Bickerton (1995). 
 
7.  The modality neutral dimensions of public language are stressed by Karmiloff-Smith in 
her closely related work on representational re-description -- see Note 8 below.  The 
relative context -- independence of the signs and symbols of public language is discussed in 
Kirsh (1991) and Clark (1993) Ch. 6. 
 
8.  The idea that advanced cognition involves repeated processes in which achieved 
knowledge and representation is redescribed in new formats (which support new kinds of 
cognitive operation and access) is pursued in much more detail in Karmiloff-Smith 1992, 
Clark 1993, Clark and Karmiloff-Smith 1994, and Dennett 1994.  The original hypothesis 
of representational redescription was developed by Karmiloff-Smith (1979, 1986). 
 





10.  Dennett (1991) explores just such a intermediate territory.  I discuss Churchland=s 
downplaying of language in detail in Clark (1996).  For examples of such downplaying see 
P.M. Churchland (1989) p. 18, P.S. and P.M. Churchland (1996) p. 265-270. 
 
11.  Fora perfect introduction to the debate, see the various essays gathered in MacDonald 
and MacDonald (eds)(1995). 
 
12.  See also Dennett’s discussion of belief versus opinion, in Dennett (1987). 
 
13.  There is of course, a midway option: that public language later becomes a language of 
thought and that Fodor's image is misguided only in its claim that all thoughts occur in 
Mentalese.  For discussion, see Carruthers (to appear). 
 
14.  See Clark (1989) p. 135, Hutchins (1995) Ch.9. 
 
15.  See Dawkins lovely (1982) book, The Extended Phenotype (Freeman) for an especially 
biologically astute treatment of this kind of case. 
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